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WHAT DO WORKERS WANT: REFLECTIONS ON 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE FREEMAN AND 
ROGERS STUDY 
Kate Bronfenbrennerf 
Despite talk in the media and academia concerning worker attitudes 
about unions and workplace participation, there is precious little data to 
inform any of these discussions. Thus, research of the scope and scale of 
the Workplace Representation and Participation Study is of enormous value 
to the field of industrial relations because it provides important insights into 
worker attitudes about their jobs, rights, power, and future opportunities. 
Yet, because there is so little other data available to put Freeman and 
Rogers's research into context, it becomes all the more essential that we 
bring great care to our analysis of their findings. This is especially true 
when we examine the question of whether workers do want more 
participation and, if so, what form it should take. At the center of the 
Freeman and Rogers study are several key words: power and cooperation, 
employee association and union, independent and collective voice, and 
discussions and negotiations. These words are most likely interpreted very 
differently by each worker surveyed and each reader of the analysis. 
The problem with Freeman and Rogers's research is captured best in 
questions 49b and 49c in the survey. Question 49b asks "Do you think 
employee organizations can be effective even if management does not 
cooperate with them, or do you think they can only be effective if 
management cooperates?"1 Not surprisingly, seventy-three percent 
answered that employee organizations can only be effective if management 
cooperates with them.2 Question 49c asks, "Which one of these employee 
organizations would you prefer? . . . [1] One that management cooperated 
with in discussing issues, but had no power to make decisions [or 2] One 
that had more power, but management opposed."3 Sixty-three percent of 
those surveyed by Freeman and Rogers said they preferred an organization 
t Director of Labor Education Research, Cornell University School of Industrial and 
Labor Relations. 
1. RICHARDB. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 176 (1999). 
2. Id. at 57. 
3. Id. at 176. 
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without decision making power that management cooperated with, while 
only twenty-two percent reported that they would prefer a powerful 
organization that management did not cooperate with.4 
What do these answers tell us? Some would argue that the responses 
seem quite obvious. As Joel Rogers said in a December, 1994 editorial in 
The Nation, shortly after the study came out, "[o]f course workers want 
'cooperative' dealings with management. If someone had a lot more power 
than you, wouldn't you want them to be in a cooperative mood?"5 
Yet, I would argue that there is something much more subtle at play 
here that comes back to why employers cooperate with workers. Why, 
under our current labor laws, does an employer ever agree to recognize a 
union or bargain an agreement? In a non-union workplace, why does an 
employer ever agree to meet with workers and address their concerns? 
Certainly employers do not cooperate because the workers or the union 
convince them that the best way to be competitive and flexible in the global 
economy is to do what the union wants. American workers and their 
unions will never win that global race to the bottom because there will 
always be some worker, somewhere, who will agree to work harder and 
faster for less money. Nor do employers cooperate because our labor laws 
have the level of enforcement and penalties that can induce employers to 
respect workers' rights to organize and collectively bargain. 
Instead, what we know is that employers cooperate with workers, 
address their concerns, and/or give them a voice only when the cost of not 
doing so—to company profits, flexibility, and public relations—is greater 
than the cost of cooperation. That is to say, employers cooperate with 
workers when workers have the power in both the workplace and the 
broader community to convince employers that cooperation is in their, the 
employers', interest. 
It is clear that the workers in Freeman and Rogers's study understood 
this, as well. They knew that absent employer cooperation, they had 
nothing. If employers refuse to listen, respond, or concede—in other 
words, refuse to cooperate—then power is meaningless. Naturally workers 
would choose an organization that the employer would cooperate with over 
one that the employer would not cooperate with because the former must 
have had some power, while any power the latter had must not have been 
real. 
The problem is that question 49b in the survey never mentioned the 
third and fourth options—a powerful organization with which the employer 
cooperated, or a weak organization with which the employer did not 
cooperate. If the survey had listed those options, the overwhelming 
4. A/, at 57. 
5. Joel Rogers, Talking Union, 259 NATION 784,785 (Dec. 26,1994). 
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majority of those surveyed would have chosen a powerful organization that 
the employer cooperated with. Workers understand that the true measure 
of the power of worker organization is the level of cooperation it receives 
from the employer. In reality, workers are most likely to choose unions 
and power when management is not willing to address their concerns, and 
is unwilling to cooperate. 
So what does this tell us about what kind of participation, voice, and 
power workers want in the workplace? Unfortunately, Freeman and 
Rogers's findings may tell us more about workers' pragmatic perceptions 
of what is possible than their hopes, wants, and dreams. As the study 
shows, workers know only too well the risks inherent in demanding an 
independent voice in the private sector workplace. As I have found in 
more than a decade of research on employer behavior in union organizing 
campaigns, the overwhelming majority of employers do everything 
possible, both inside and outside of the law, to keep their workplaces union 
free. One in four workplaces discharge workers for union activity, more 
than half threaten to close down all or part of their facility if workers 
succeed in organizing, and under the cover of employer free speech, more 
than ninety percent use captive audience meetings, supervisor one-on-ones, 
and a steady stream of letters and leaflets to aggressively put out their anti-
union message.6 In combination, these legal and illegal employer tactics 
create a climate so fraught with fear and conflict, that it seems as if workers 
must jump through successive hoops of fire just to exercise their legal right 
to choose a union in their workplace.7 
Employer opposition to unionization does not stop once the election is 
won. The majority of employers continue the meetings, threats, stalling, 
and intimidation throughout the first contract campaign, so that only two-
thirds of the units where the union won the election, and fewer than a third 
of the 400,000 private sector workers who attempt to organize each year, 
end up being covered by a collective bargaining agreement.8 As Freeman 
and Rogers found, even those that do not attempt to organize are well 
aware of the potential for employer opposition.9 
Faced with these odds, it is little wonder that so many workers do not 
see unions as a viable alternative, but instead hope against hope for another 
form of employee organization that would get the employer to cooperate 
with them without the terrible risks and costs involved in a union 
6. See Kate Bronfenbrenner, Uneasy Terrain: The Impact of Capital Mobility on 
Workers, Wages, and Union Organizing, A Report Submitted to The United States Trade 
Deficit Review Commission, at 43-48 (Sept. 6, 2000) (discussing anti-union tactics of 
employers and their effects). 
7. Id. 
8. Id at 54. 
9. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 60. 
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organizing campaign. As Tom Juravich and I argued in a Newsday op-ed 
piece shortly after the Freeman and Rogers's study was released: 
[I]t is a leap of faith to assume that this increased interest in 
cooperation is of the same order that trade unionism was for 
workers a generation ago—and a genuine replacement for it. 
What Freeman and Rogers have identified is not a new social 
movement about to burst forth on the scene. Instead, they have 
captured the quiet mass resignation of American workers to a 
system that robs them of any hope for real power on the job . . . . 
If one had polled workers in the 1920s, the findings would have 
been very similar. Workers' organizations had been rendered 
powerless by the law. With few other options, many participated 
in the company unions that were the equivalent of today's 
employee-involvement programs. 
Yet, just as today, these employee-representation plans did not 
embody the hopes and dreams of workers and their families. 
And as soon as the social and political climate changed in the 
1930s, the Congress of Industrial Organizations burst forth with a 
level of mass organization unheard of among American 
i 10 
workers. 
What Freeman and Rogers have captured is the same phenomenon 
that explains why, despite the longest economic expansion in recent 
history, real wages for American workers have remained relatively flat.11 
Yes, many Americans are doing better than in the recent past.12 In the 
context of corporate mergers, leveraged buyouts, contracting out, and 
capital flight, however, there is a greater sense of economic insecurity 
today than there was in the depths of recession of the 1980s.13 As Federal 
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan explained in his testimony before the 
Senate Banking Committee in February 1997, it is this "[a]typical restraint 
on compensation increases [which]... appears to be mainly the 
consequence of greater worker insecurity" which has driven our 
"sustainable economic expansion."14 
10. Tom Juravich & Kate Bronfenbrenner, Obits for Unions are Premature, NEWSDAY, 
Jan. 12,1995, at A37. 
11. Bronfenbrenner, supra note 6, at 1-8. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Statement of Alan Greenspan, Prepared Statement of Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System Before the House Banking and Financial Services Committee, 
Domestic and International Monetary Policy, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 5, 1997, 
available at NEXIS, News Library, FEDNEW FILE. 
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To learn more about what workers want, we must look at the public 
sector. This does not mean that we should focus our attention on 
unorganized workers in states without collective bargaining, like those 
Freeman and Rogers surveyed in their public sector study. Unfortunately, 
those workers have even less hope of being able to organize than workers 
covered under our private sector labor laws. Instead, we should look at the 
tens of thousands of state and local workers in public sector jurisdictions 
covered by collective bargaining laws who are enthusiastically choosing 
unions with win rates, victory margins, and election turnouts all above 
eighty-five percent.15 
These public sector workers operate in a climate largely free from the 
kind of brutal opposition routinely faced by workers organizing in the 
private sector. Yet, these workers— teachers, clerical workers, snow plow 
drivers, fire fighters, computer programmers, and city managers—are not 
inherently different from their counterparts organizing in the private sector. 
What is different is the extent and nature of employer opposition in the 
public sector, namely that one quarter of all public sector employers do not 
offer any opposition, and only eight percent run the kind of aggressive anti-
union campaigns that are the norm in the private sector.16 
What the data from the public sector tells us is that workers want 
unions and readily choose unions if they can achieve them without jumping 
through those hoops of fire. What Freeman and Rogers's findings reveal is 
that even with those hoops of fire, forty percent of private sector workers 
state that they would choose a union if an election were held in their 
workplace today. 
What of those workers in the Freeman and Rogers study, however, 
who said they wanted something else; some kind of less adversarial 
alternative to unions? A clear majority expressed a desire for an employee 
organization where they could elect their own leaders, resolve grievances 
through independent third party arbitration, and gain access to company 
information. More than eighty percent reported that they believed that they 
enjoyed just cause protection under current employment laws. 
What if the workers being surveyed had been told that the only 
workers and workers' organizations who enjoy these rights and powers 
were organized and covered by union collective bargaining agreements? 
What if they knew and understood that ninety percent of their unionized 
counterparts reported on the survey that being union and staying union is 
worth it?17 Then, perhaps, the responses of the unorganized workers 
Freeman and Rogers surveyed would have been quite different. 
15. KATE BRONFENBRENNER & TOM JURAVICH, UNION ORGANIZING IN THE PUBLIC 
SECTOR 5-10 (1995). 
16. Id. 
17. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 60. 
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We must also wonder what the responses would have been if the 
survey had been conducted today, rather than at labor's toughest moment in 
the early 1990s, when Leo Troy's projection of union density dropping to 
seven percent by the year 2000 seemed all too real.18 Today, we would 
most likely find a very different set of responses when workers are seeing 
unions win strikes at large companies such as UPS, Boeing, Verizon, and 
Bridgestone/Firestone. Unions are winning major organizing campaigns 
with janitors, hotel workers, textile workers, airline ticket agents, nurses, 
and home care workers, focusing on issues that resonate with organized 
and unorganized workers alike. Unions are changing the face of the labor 
movement. Union leaders and activists in the news today are young and 
old, male and female, white collar or blue collar, immigrant or native born. 
We do not know, and will not, know the answer to that question until there 
is more research of the scope and scale of the Freeman and Rogers's 
study—research that frames the questions in a manner that better captures 
the reality of the power dynamic in today's workplace. It is a challenge for 
industrial relations research that must be met if we are to speak accurately 
and knowledgeably about what workers want in the twenty-first century 
workplace. 
18. Leo Troy, Big Labor's Big Problems, Bus. & Soc'Y REV., 49 n.87 (Fall 1993). 
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